Albuquerque Criminal Lawyer Blog

In State v. Toms, the New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed the foundational requirements for admission of breath alcohol score results in a DWI trial. The Court in Toms reiterated the ruling in the 2007 New Mexico Supreme Court case of State v. Martinez. In addition, the Court expanded on Martinez in addressing the proper procedural grounds by which a defendant may attack the foundation of the breath alcohol results.

The Court first stated that calibration of the machine by the officer was not enough. Though calibration of the machine is a measure to insure the accuracy of the breath alcohol score, it is insufficient to establish the foundation for admission of the score into evidence at trial. In addition, as stated in Martinez, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the machine has been properly certified and the certification is current at the time of the test. The State in short must show that the machine has been properly certified, the certification is current, and the machine was certified by the Scientific Laboratory Division of the Department of Health (SLD).

Failure to fully establish the foundation for admission of the breath alcohol score will render the evidence inadmissible. These foundational requirements are meant to insure the accuracy of the breath alcohol scores and to protect defendants against unreliable or inaccurate tests results. The State argued that the defendant must raise the issue prior to trial. Effectively, the State argued that the defendant was obligated to alert the State to weaknesses in its case prior to trial in essence providing the State with the opportunity to cure the defect.

Fortunately, the Court disagreed. This foundation is the State's responsibility, not the defendant's. The Court expressly expanded on Martinez to address the State's argument. The Court stated that the defendant has no obligation to raise the deficiency in the State's case via pre-trial motion as the trial court and the State had suggested. The Court stated that the state has the burden of laying the foundation for the breath alcohol test results and that the Court would not "require the defense to file a pretrial motion simply to advise the prosecution that it may have a defect in its proof or some problem in establishing the appropriate evidentiary foundation."

DWI is enforced very vigorously in New Mexico for good reason. DWI is a threat to the safety of all of us and our families who drive New Mexico roads. However, on occasion, DWI is perhaps enforced a little too vigorously as was the recently invalidate practice of arresting drivers who were sleeping in their cars, and the continuing practice of arresting and prosecuting drivers at breath alcohol levels below .08. Fortunately, the Court in State v. Tom has not shifted the burden of prosecution to the defendant him or herself by placing the responsibility of foundational elements to the defendant. After all, the defendant should not carry the burden of prosecuting him or herself despite the efficiencies that would come from such a requirement.

Parrish Collins
Albuquerque Attorney
www.CollinsAttorneys.com

The New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed 4th Amendment search & seizure issues in State v. Jose Manuel Martinez. The case involved the expansion of an investigation of an felony aggravated battery case to the detention of the defendant until a canine unit could be called to the scene for a search of the defendant's car.

The defendant was identified as the perpetrator in an aggravated battery where the alleged victim had suffered serious injuries and coma. The police officers went to the location of the alleged incident where they found a number of individuals including the defendant. The officers smelled marijuana in the residence and asked the occupants to step outside. The officers conducted a walk through search but found no evidence of drugs or weapons.

Despite the apparent lack of any evidence of a crime at the scene, the officers then asked if the defendant had any weapons in his car. The defendant answered that all he had in his car was a crowbar. The officer asked to search the car. Defendant refused the search stating that he would retrieve the crowbar for the officer. The officer then detained the defendant calling in the canine unit. Upon searching the vehicle, the officers found two bags containing cocaine, a digital scale, and rolling papers resulting in charges of trafficking a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia.

The question was whether the expansion of the investigation under these circumstances was reasonable and constitutional under the 4th Amendment. The Court of Appeals found that the expansion was reasonable thereby denying the defendant's motion for suppression of the cocaine and paraphernalia.

The court stated, "An officer may expand the scope of an investigatory stop if the officer has reasonable suspicion that other criminal activity is taking or has taken place... If evidence of another crime surfaces during a routine investigatory stop, the officer may proceed in a reasonable manner to investigate." The court was quite generous toward the investigating officers in allowing for the search on these grounds. The Court stated that the defendant's admission that he had a crowbar, but refusal to allow the search of his vehicle, was an indication of other criminal activity sufficient to justify the detention of the defendant until the canine unit arrived, and the search of the defendant's car.

In light of the customary deference to the 4th Amendment and the expansive protections against unlawful search and seizure under New Mexico law, the outcome is somewhat surprising. The case seems like a good candidate for further appeal to the New Mexico Supreme Court where there may be a different outcome.

Parrish Collins
Albuquerque Attorney
www.CollinsAttorneys.com

The New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of a "reach-in" search of a defendant on a busy street in the recent case of State v. Williams. The court found that the search was an unlawful invasion of privacy under the circumstances and therefore and illegal search and seizure under the 4th Amendment.

In a nutshell, there was a felony warrant outstanding on the defendant. The officer legally pulled the defendant over in his car. The officer legally placed the defendant under arrest due to the warrant. The officer then pulled out the defendant's waist-band on his pants looking in and seizing crack cocaine in the defendant's pants. The search and seizure was conducted in broad daylight on a busy city street. The defendant argued the search constituted an illegal strip. The Court disagreed that it was a strip search. However, the Court still found the search to be unreasonable under the circumstances and therefore unconstitutional.

The issue that arose was not whether the officer was entitled to search the defendant. All parties agreed that the officer had the right to search the defendant. However, the manner of the search was found to be unreasonable and unconstitutional under the 4th Amendment. The Court recognized that there are situations where the suspect's sense of modesty and privacy are overridden by exceptional circumstances. However, the cases all indicated that reasonable steps must be taken to protect the suspect's privacy. The Court stated that there was must a proper balance between the immediate need to search the suspect and the invasion of privacy and embarrassment associated with a public search.

In State v. Williams, the search was conducted in broad daylight during rush hour. No evidence was presented by the State showing that appropriate steps were taken to lessen the invasion of the defendant's privacy or that the situation dictated an immediate search in the manner it was conducted. In fact, according to the Court, the trial court did not consider at all the reasonableness of the location or the manner of the search.

Because the State failed to show the reasonableness of the search, or necessity under the circumstances, the search was found to be illegal and the crack cocaine was suppressed. Many will take objection to the ruling. The ruling may seem to run against common sense. However, the New Mexico courts are very protective of constitutional rights often extending protections well beyond the federal courts in similar situations. And the simple fact is the officer could have waited and conducted a full strip search once the suspect was taken to jail. The search as conducted simply was not necessary and some very basic steps could have protected both the defendant's right to privacy as well as the officer's seizure of evidence.

Parrish Collins
Albuquerque Attorney
www.CollinsAttorneys.com

The 4th Amendment protections against unlawful search and seizure generally require a warrant grounded in probable cause prior to the search of a citizen's home. It has long been recognized that the broad protections of the 4th Amendment do not apply to those on probation or parole. The issue was addressed most recently in the New Mexico Court of Appeals case of State v. Benavidez.

In Benavidez, the defendant's parole officer visited the defendant's home for a parole visit. The parole officer knocked on the door repeatedly. The defendant would not answer the door. The parole officer saw the curtains in the defendant's bedroom moving. There was also a car in the driveway in which the parole officer had earlier seen the defendant driving. The parole officer called for police backup. Upon arrival, the officers kicked in the door. Upon searching the home, they found the defendant hiding under a bed. They also found meth and paraphernalia in the defendant's bedroom where he was found hiding.

The defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia. He entered a conditional plea to the charges reserving his right to appeal the constitutionality of the search and seizure. The defendant argued that the search and seizure was illegal and therefore the drugs and the paraphernalia should be suppressed. The court of appeals found the search and seizure to be lawful drawing upon abundant case-law supporting the search and seizure of the parolee's home.

The court indicated that probationers and parolees do not enjoy the same protections under the 4th Amendment as do ordinary citizens. The Court cited the interests in the State in supervising probationers/parolees which dictate a lesser expectation of privacy. In fact, probation and parole agreements require that the probationer/parolee submit to reasonable searches of his or her home. Thus, a search may be conducted for reasonable suspicion rather than the higher standard of probable cause that applies to ordinary citizens.

In this case, the Court found that the refusal of the defendant to open his door for his parole officer provided reasonable suspicion for the search. The refusal itself constituted a violation of the terms of parole which alone was sufficient grounds for the search. Based upon the Court's finding that the search and seizure were legal under the 4th Amendment, the defendant's appeal was denied.

Parrish Collins
Albuquerque Attorney
www.CollinsAttorneys.com

Broad discovery is fundamental to due process in the defense of criminal charges. The New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed the issue in State v. Ortiz. The court stated that a defendant is entitled to all discovery that might reasonably relate to the defense. The defendant need not know in advance that the records, documents or other evidence are helpful, but only that they might possibly be helpful to the defense.

Ortiz involved a DWI stop. The officer stated in grand jury testimony that he stopped the defendant due to erratic driving behavior. Through discovery, the State provided a videotape of the incident. However, the video was missing 6 minutes of footage. The defendant insisted that the State provide the excised portion of the tape. The State refused stating that the missing portion was irrelevant to the case. The defendant also requested the officer's cell phone records for the missing 6 minute period. Again, the State refused stating that the officer had an expectation of privacy in his personal cell phone records.

The district court ordered the State to provide both the missing video footage as well as the officer's cell phone records for the six minute period. The State refused. The Court, exercising its discretionary authority for discovery violations, suppressed all evidence arising from the DWI stop which resulted in dismissal of the case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case.

The Court of Appeals reiterated the liberal discovery standard in criminal cases. The court cited United States v. Lloyd, a 1993 D.C. Circuit Court case, as follows: the "materiality standard...is not a heavy burden; rather, evidence is material as long as there is a strong indication that it will play an important role in uncovering admissible evidence, aiding witness preparation , corroborating testimony or assisting impeachment or rebuttal."

The Court agreed with the district court that both the missing video footage and the officer's cell phone records during the missing 6 minutes might play a role in the defense. It was not up to the defendant to prove the materiality of the evidence. Instead, the defendant had the right to obtain and review the evidence for its materiality. The court indicated that liberal discovery was fundamental to the defendant's due process rights and his right to a fair trial.

The Court's ruling as well as the liberal rules of discovery are essential to the defense. In addition, they reflect plain common sense. A defendant would hardly be entitled to any discovery if it were required that he or she first show the materiality of the evidence before obtaining it. The materiality of evidence often cannot be known until it has been reviewed. In many cases, a review of the evidence may find that it is immaterial or otherwise inadmissible. But due process dictates that all potentially material or relevant evidence be disclosed. Only then can a determination of admissibility be undertaken. It takes little imagination to envision potential abuse of a less stringent discovery rule.

Parrish Collins
Albuquerque Attorney
www.CollinsAttorneys.com

The New Mexico Court of Appeals draws the parameters of investigatory stops in State v. Eric K. An anonymous call was made to 911 reporting that a female had pulled a gun and took the caller's money during an apparent drug transaction. A police officer went to the area where the alleged crime had occurred to investigate. Upon arrival, he noticed two male youths that he believed looked a little bit nervous but "nothing real suspicious."

Based upon the 911 report and his belief that the two youths looked nervous, the officer initiated contact with the youths. As the officer approached, the youths began to enter a laundromat. The officer called for them to come over to speak with him. During the conversation, the officer instructed one of the children to remove his hands from his pockets. At that time, one side of the child's coat hung lower than the other prompting the officer to pat down the child. A gun, drugs and drug paraphernalia were discovered in the pat down search. The child moved to suppress all of the evidence as fruits of an illegal search & seizure. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed.

An officer is always free to initiate a voluntary encounter with a citizen. However, once the circumstances are such that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave, the encounter turns into a seizure for which there must be reasonable suspicion. Mere proximity to a reported crime does not constitute reasonable suspicion,. Nor does looking a little nervous. Instead, the court reiterated the well-established rule that there must be "individualized, articulable, reasonable suspicion" at the time of the seizure which the court found in this case to be when the officer ordered the child to remove his hands from his pockets.

The 4th Amendment provides significant protection against illegal search and seizure. This includes cases where officers without reasonable suspicion, but merely on a hunch or perhaps simply in the process of fishing for evidence, initiate an non-voluntary investigative encounter with a citizen. The 4th Amendment attempts to balance individual rights against community and officer safety.

This case points out the tension between these interests. On the one hand, the child had a gun, an illegal act and perhaps a danger to the community. On the other, the officer had no basis for investigating the child. It is a difficult balance for law enforcement and the courts as the interests on both sides are extremely important. However, the 4th Amendment right against unlawful search and seizure must not be compromised on a case by case basis where an officer just happens upon a crime through an illegal investigation. To allow the end result of an illegal investigation to justify the unlawful police conduct would render the 4th Amendment meaningless. As much as a case like this rattles our insecurities, the alternative is far worse.

Parrish Collins
Albuquerque Attorney
www.CollinsAttorneys.com

The recent 10th Circuit Court of Appeals case of US v. Silva-Arzeta brings both further illumination and concerns to the recent Arizona immigration enforcement bill. There are many in New Mexico clamoring for Arizona style immigration enforcement in our state. This case will provide little comfort to those already concerned about this prospect and the forfeiture of individual rights that it would bring.

In a nutshell, the defendant was stopped by officers while in his car leaving his apartment on suspicion of drug trafficking. The officers questioned the defendant in English. They searched his vehicle finding meth and $1038 in cash. The officers alleged that the defendant then consented to the search of his apartment. Really! That's what they alleged. They stopped him in his car, he is drug trafficker, and he consented to the search of his apartment. Drug dealers everywhere would be appalled by his lack of professionalism. All this was done in English.

After he was arrested, the defendant was finally provided a Spanish speaking interpreter for further questioning at the station. The interrogation at the station was conducted entirely in Spanish. The officers that obtained the consent to the search, searched the defendant's car and apartment and placed him under arrest stated that the defendant's English was fine. It is not clear why the station interrogation was in Spanish given the defendant's mastery of the English language. Perhaps it was because he did not speak English as testified to by his employer who stated that the defendant spoke little English and that he had to use a bilingual employee to assist him in communicating with the defendant on the job.

The defendant was acquitted of all charges in the first trial. The state was able to obtain a retrial and the defendant was then convicted on all counts. The defendant appealed arguing that all evidence seized in the case was seized in violation of the 4th Amendment prohibitions against unlawful search and seizure. The defendant argued that the consent to the search was not and could not be consensual due to his inability to adequately understand English. The 10th Circuit affirmed the conviction.

The court recognized that any warrantless search is presumed unreasonable. One exception of course is a consensual search. The Court stated that "Whether voluntary consent was given is a question of fact, determined by the totality of the circumstances and reviewed for clear error." In short, the question is left to the jury who judgment should not be second guessed. The most obvious question being which jury should we rely on? The first jury that acquitted him on all counts, or the second jury that convicted him?

The court recognized established case-law that "invalidated searches based on consents ... given by Hispanics who did not comprehend what they were doing." Despite the case-law, the court affirmed the conviction stating "Mr. Silva-Arzeta could converse in English sufficiently well to consent to the search." Naturally, no guidance was provided for the definition of "sufficiently well" effectively leaving it up the judgment of law enforcement.

Keep in mind this is what happened here. The defendant's English speaking ability was entirely evaluated by the arresting officers. The testimony of the defendant's employer was ignored as was the defendant's own testimony. And none of the conversations with the defendant were recorded. Not at the scene, and not at the station during the Spanish language interrogation. None of the officers saw fit to record these conversations despite the ease with which it can be done with the officers' standard issue belt-tapes.

These issues are even more problematic when the court states: "Mr. Silva-Arzeta's concerns, however, are the bread and butter of litigation. Much of the controversy at trials could be minimized, if not eliminated, if all acts were videotaped and all conversations recorded." The court further recognized approvingly the defendant's citation of Justice Department guidelines that suggest this practice. However, the court dismissed these as mere suggestions of best practice that do not give rise to constitutional concerns.

In short, a Spanish speaker has no right to protection against unlawful search and seizure. The defendant could be held to have consented based purely upon the self-serving testimony of the arresting officers as in this case where there was no mention of other corroborating witnesses to the defendant's ability to understand and speak English. Finally, officers are not required to record any of the encounter, unless they so choose despite the obvious evidentiary value of a recording.

The folks of New Mexico might want to keep an eye on the immigration enforcement debate in the upcoming elections. It's not just drug dealers that will suffer if New Mexico heads down this path of Arizona. It is not just drug dealers that benefit from the 4th Amendment protections against unlawful search & seizure. Use your imagination, I am out of space, and out of time.

Parrish Collins
Albuquerque Attorney
www.CollinsAttorneys.com

The New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed the knock and announce rule in the recent case of State v. Gonzales. It is well established in New Mexico that law enforcement must first knock and announce their presence and wait a reasonable amount of time for a response before entering a residence to execute a search warrant.

The rule avoids the needless destruction of property while recognizing the sanctity of the home and the right to privacy. Failure to comply with this rule constitutes unlawful search and seizure in violation of the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court, in its ruling, reinforced these very important protections afforded by the knock and announce rule.

In State v. Gonzales, the Court addressed a situation where it the facts indicated that the officers had not knocked and had waited only 8 seconds after announcing their presence before bursting through the front door with a battering ram. The Court determined that, under the circumstances, 8 seconds was not a reasonable amount of time to wait following announcement of their presence. The Court also deferred to the District Court's factual finding, based upon the officers' belt tapes, that the police had not knocked despite uncontroverted testimony to the contrary. As a result, the marijuana and cocaine seized from the residence was suppressed.

The Court, in determining the reasonableness of the 8 seconds, contrasted the facts in the case with several prior rulings. There are circumstances where a brief wait following announcement of the officer's presence would be deemed reasonable. The court cited several prior cases involving hotel/motel rooms and other small residences where a brief wait was justified due to the brief amount of time that it would require the resident to get to the door. A delay in these cases would indicate constructive refusal of the warrant.

Likewise, the Court indicated there might be exigent circumstances that would avoid completely the necessity of the knock and announce rule. These cases involved situations where the circumstances indicated announcement posed a danger to law enforcement. An indication that the target was attempting to destroy evidence would also obviate the need for a knock and announce.

The Court was careful to indicate that the fact that evidence might be destroyed was insufficient to override the protections of the knock and announce rule. Therefore, the simple fact that drugs were involved, which could be easily destroyed, was insufficient grounds to avoid the knock and announce rule. There must be some indication under the circumstances that the suspect was in fact attempting to destroy evidence.

State v. Gonzales illustrates the great deference the New Mexico Courts have for the 4th Amendment and the U.S. Constitution, often exceeding federal constitutional protections.

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New Mexico law allows a DWI/DUI suspect to request independent chemical testing. In fact, NMSA 66-8-109(B) requires that the officer inform the suspect of this right. The question arises what happens if the officer fails to offer the independent chemical test?

The law dictates that the breath alcohol score must be suppressed for failure to inform the DWI/DUI suspect of the right to independent chemical testing. The problem is in proving the failure of the officer to comply with the law.

As is often the case in DWI/DUI cases in New Mexico, the issue boils down to issues of credibility. Who is the court or jury to believe, the cop or the suspect? It is often a coin toss with the jury. As for the Court, it is clear that the presumptions are with the cop. This is so in the impaired to slightest degree, under the .08 limits DWI/DUI cases, where you are impaired if the cop says you are impaired. It is equally so in the advice of rights for independent chemical testing.

This presumption was made clear in the 2007 case of State v. Duarte. In that case, the officer videotaped the field sobriety tests. Presumably this same video would have carried evidence of the reading of the implied consent and the advice of rights for independent chemical testing. The cop lost the video. The Court made some interesting rulings allowing in testimony regarding the field sobriety tests despite the loss of the only real evidence of the suspect's performance.

Further, the suspect said that he was not informed of that right. The cop did not say he did inform him of that right. Instead, he said it was his general practice to read the advice of rights. Despite the loss of the video, again the only true evidence of the reading of those rights, and the officer's lack of recollection of the reading other than his general practice, the Court ruled in favor of the State and refused to exclude the breath alcohol results.

This case, like the under the limits DWI/DUI arrests on the impaired to the slightest degree standard, points to the real presumptions in DWI/DUI cases in New Mexico. Is there really a presumption of innocence when an officer need only opine that the suspect was impaired for a DWI/DUI conviction? Is there really any due process protection at all when as in this case the only tangible evidence of the officer's compliance with the law has been lost, and yet the officer is allowed to testify to what would have been on the video based general procedure?

The great majority of law enforcement officers are honest, competent and professional. Due process protects society against those that are not. New Mexico's DWI/DUI laws present a sliding scale of justice which is dependent upon the luck of the draw on the cop, the prosecutor and the judge. Fairness, justice and due process are situational. Is DWI/DUI such a threat to our society that it justifies the rebalancing of our system of justice?

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The New Mexico Supreme Court addressed expert testimony given by police officer in DWI/DUI trials in State v. Marquez. The case involved an Albuquerque police officer who gave testimony regarding the statistical correlations between a suspect's performance on field sobriety tests and the probability of a blood alcohol score over .08.

The defendant's attorney had argued that the officer was not qualified as an expert to testify on statistical probabilities under the U.S. Supreme Court case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. Interestingly, the State conceded that the testimony given by the officer was improperly admitted. Instead, the State argued that the admission of the evidence was harmless because there was sufficient legally admitted evidence for the conviction.

The case of State v. Marquez is interesting because the New Mexico Supreme Court found that the testimony was unnecessary for the conviction. The Court cited New Mexico Uniform Jury Instruction 14-4501 along with the well established New Mexico case law suggesting that the true standard is whether the defendant's ability to drive was impaired to the slightest degree.

The testimony of the officer undoubtedly would have established this without the statistical testimony. The officer testified that she saw the defendant stumble out of a bar, get in his car, almost strike another vehicle as he backed out of his parking space, and then back 60 feet into oncoming traffic on a congested and dangerous street. In addition, the officer testified that the defendant was slow to respond to questions, fumbled with his identification, was slow getting out of his vehicle, had to brace himself against his vehicle for balance and generally performed poorly on the field sobriety tests.

In light of impaired to the slightest degree standard, the statistical evidence was hardly necessary. However, the prosecutor got a little greedy perhaps and solicited the testimony anyway over the objection of the defense attorney. Basically, the officer gave testimony on statistical studies suggesting that poor performance on the field sobriety tests correlates to a high probability that the defendant's breath score exceeded the .08 limit.

The Court recognized that because of the impaired to the slightest degree standard, the breath alcohol score is not necessary for a DWI/DUI conviction in New Mexico. The Court further recognized that it is common knowledge that a breath score of over .08 is an indication of impairment. Thus, the testimony of the Albuquerque police officer, though unnecessary for a conviction, could have confused and misled the jury. In short, the testimony may have distracted the jury from its role of weighing properly admitted evidence by undue attention to the wrongfully admitted statistical evidence. In essence, the statistical evidence improperly undermined the credibility of the defendant.

Because the evidence was improperly admitted and could have confused or distracted the jury, the defendant's DWI conviction was reversed. The case was remanded for a new trial. In light of the evidence available to the State, and the Court's ruling that the breath alcohol score is unnecessary, the outcome of the new trial is likely to be the same as the first.

The case is somewhat paradoxical that the Court further restricts the bounds of admissible DWI evidence while at the same time reiterating its position that such evidence is unnecessary anyway. However, the case should prove important in cases where the evidence of intoxication is not so overwhelming as was the case here.

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A case in Ohio's Supreme Court recently set forth a framework for protection against the unlawful search & seizure of a suspect's cell phone. The case hopefully signifies a legal trend that should will across the country, including Albuquerque and the remainder of New Mexico.

The case of State v. Antwuan Smith established a warrant requirement prior to the search of person's cell phone. This marks the first time that the Supreme Court of any state has addressed this issue.

It is well established that searches conducted without a warrant are presumed unreasonable. There are exceptions related to officer safety and preservation of evidence which allow the officer to search the area within the arrestee's immediate control. If there is no issue of officer safety or preservation of evidence, then the exception no longer applies. It is equally well established that an officer may search any containers or articles on the defendant' person such as purses. Law enforcement have attempted to equate a person's cell phone to a purse or in the alternative to argue that search of a cell phone is necessary for the preservation of evidence. The Supreme Court of Ohio has refuted these arguments.

The Court's analysis rested upon the classification of a cell phone. A 5th Circuit Court of Appeals case analogized a cell phone to a closed container in the possession of the accused. However, this ruling partly arose as a result of the defendant's legal theory which in part conceded the analogy. The United States District Court for Northern California suppressed the warrantless search of a cell phone. The court reasoned that cell phones are far more than communication devices. Instead, they store immense volumes of personal information and the court said they were more akin to laptop computers which have far greater privacy protections than do purses.

The Ohio court took the latter position. As a result, the evidence seized from the warrantless search of the cell phone was ordered suppressed. The court's ruling recognized that the defendant's phone was not a smart phone but rather a less sophisticated model with phone, texting and camera capabilities.

The Ohio court stated that the 4th Amendment serves to protect the reasonable and justifiable expectations of privacy. The court found that citizens have reasonable expectation of the privacy of their cell phones. Moreover, there is no issue of officer safety or preservation of evidence that would suggest a warrantless search of a cell phone.

The law often trails behind the development of technology. The Ohio Supreme Court serves notice to law enforcement its own state as well those in other states that the warrantless search of cell phone which has become routine in criminal investigations will likely be challenged under the 4th Amendment. The issue is likely to become even more prevalent as many individuals now possess a variety of devices such as I-Pods, flash drives, and other devices capable of voluminous data storage.

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The United States Supreme Court finds that the 6th Amendment right to confrontation requires that an analyst who tested drugs in the lab must testify in court to get those lab results entered into evidence. This important case will impact both drug cases and DWI/DUI cases in Albuquerque and throughout New Mexico.

The United States Supreme Court case of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts involved the introduction of evidence by the prosecution of laboratory certificates from the state laboratory regarding cocaine connected to the defendant. The analyst that conducted the testing of the cocaine was not present at trial.

The defendant objected to the admission of the lab certificate without in-court testimony by the lab analyst. The defendant argued that the practice was a violation of the 6th Amendment confrontation clause as set forth in the 2004 Supreme Court case Crawford v. Washington.

The United States Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts agreed that the practice of admitting lab certificates in lieu of or in the absence of foundational testimony was a violation of the confrontation clause as set forth in Crawford.

The court rejected the prosecution's arguments that these analyst were not accusatory witnesses. The court stated that there was no exemption from the confrontation clause for those witnesses testifying to facts other those observed at the crime scene. The court found any witness who offers his testimony is subject to the confrontation clause.

The court also refused the prosecution's argument that these certificates are excluded from the hearsay rules as official business record. Likewise, the Court refused the argument that these lab analysts are neutral and unbiased simply applying scientific methods to the substance in question. Finally, the court stated that it was immaterial that the defendant himself could have subpoenaed the analyst to court holding that it was the State's burden to bring their witnesses to court for foundational purposes.

The Melendez case could have significant impact on cases throughout the State of New Mexico. It appears that the ruling will cover the admission of lab results from New Mexico's scientific lab division in both drug cases and DWI/DUI cases. The cases are winding their way through the New Mexico courts now as the Courts here attempt to deal with the Melendez-Diaz rulings.

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The recent New Mexico Supreme Court case of State v. Joshua Garcia makes clear that Article II, Section 10 of New Mexico's Constitution extends greater protection from illegal search and seizure than that set forth in the 1991United States Supreme Court case of California v. Hodari D.

State v. Garcia involved a domestic violence call whereby the caller indicated that she wanted an individual named Joshua Garcia removed from her home. Upon responding to the call, the officer saw a man walking across the street near the caller's address. The officer immediately flashed his spot light on the unidentified man and told the man to stop. The officer had no prior knowledge of the identification of the defendant. Garcia continued walking past the patrol car and which point the officer again instructed him to stop. Garcia ignored the instructions of the officer and continued walking. The officer sprayed Garcia twice with pepper spray. As Garcia continued walking, the officer saw something fall from his pocket at which time the officer tackled and handcuffed Garcia. The article that fell from Garcia's pocket was identified as crack cocaine.

Garcia was charged which possession of crack cocaine. The question that arose was whether the evidence of crack cocaine should be excluded from evidence as the fruit of an illegal search and seizure by the officer. The District Court refused to suppress the evidence under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. Garcia pled guilty to the charges reserving his right to challenge the court's suppression ruling.

The Court followed the ruling set forth in the 1997 New Mexico Supreme Court case of State v. Gomez. State v. Gomez explicitly recognized that New Mexico's constitutional protections could at times exceed the protections afforded under federal law. Upon applying the law set forth in Gomez, the Court found in Garcia that New Mexico's Constitution, Article II, Section 10 provided greater protection than that set forth in Hodari D.

In Hodari D, officers drove up on a group of youths huddled together. Upon seeing the patrol unit, the youth took flight. The officers pursued the youth on foot. During the pursuit, one of the youth discarded a rock of crack cocaine. The officer tackled the youth and recovered the discarded crack. The United States Supreme Court found that the youth was not seized at the time the crack was discarded. The Court determined that a seizure is defined by the reaction of the suspect. Because the suspect fled, there was no seizure despite the fact that the pursuit lacked any reasonable basis from its inception. Because there was no seizure, the evidence was not illegally seized.

The New Mexico Court in Garcia reverted back to the law as previously set forth by the United States Supreme Court in the 1980 case of U.S. v. Mendenhall. Mendenhall stated that a person is seized when a reasonable person under the circumstance would not feel free to leave. Utilizing the Mendenhall standard, and the protections set forth in Article II, Section 10, the Court found that Joshua Garcia was illegally seized at the moment the officer shown his spot on him and commanded him to stop. Because there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop, the search and seizure that ensued was illegal, and the crack cocaine should have been excluded from evidence.

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The 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution reads:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The 4th Amendment protections against unlawful search and seizure rests on the right to privacy proving protection against unlawful and abusive law enforcement practices that would invade that right to privacy. The protections of the 4th Amendment are broad and complex. Entire books are written on the 4th Amendment, and there are legal scholars that spend much of their careers studying and writing about the 4th Amendment. Many of the most important cases in criminal law and criminal procedure derive from the 4th Amendment as do the rights of criminal defendants.

The importance of the protections afforded under the 4th Amendment cannot be over-stated. The 4th Amendment protects at every stage of a criminal case from the initial stop by the officer, to the search of the suspect's vehicle, home, property or other belongings both before, during or after the arrest, and of course to the arrest itself.

The 4th Amendment provides protection in all variety of encounters with law enforcement. The protections stretch from the petty shoplifting offense, to DWI/DUI stops and investigations to the most serious felony offenses. Violations of the 4th Amendment have serious consequences including the exclusion of evidence seized illegally. Often, the exclusion of illegally seized evidence will result in the dismissal of the charges in whole or in part. Should the prosecutor refuse to dismiss based upon the lack of evidence, the exclusion of the illegally seized evidence can be an insurmountable obstacle for the prosecution at trial.

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Miranda warnings are required whenever there has been a formal arrest or a restraint of movement indicating a formal arrest. The recent New Mexico Court of Appeals decision in State v. Hernandez makes it clear that there is no such formal arrest or restraint when the suspect voluntarily converses with a police officer over the phone.

In the case of State v. Hernandez, the police were called to a home that had been receiving repeated threatening phone calls. Following each phone call, the caller allegedly fired shots into the home. Upon arrival of the officers, the caller called the home again. The officer answered the phone. The Defendant's phone number was indicated on caller ID. The caller then made incriminating statements including identifying himself as Roberto and confirming he was the shooter.

At trial, the Defendant's attorneys were successful in suppressing the statements of the Defendant as a violation of the Defendant's Miranda rights. Miranda v. Arizona requires that the suspect be under interrogation while in custody. The Court found that Hernandez was neither in custody nor under interrogation as he voluntarily initiated the phone call as well as the conversation. He was free to hang up the phone. Instead, he made the statements voluntarily.

The lesson here is clear: Stop Talking and Hang Up the Phone. It is exceedingly unwise to voluntarily give incriminating statements to a police officer over the phone particularly when you initiated the call. Miranda will not protect you here.

There were other issues regarding the rights of the Defendant to confront witnesses under Crawford v. Washington. The Court remanded the case to District Court for a determination of facts necessary for the Crawford determination including the identification of the caller, and the related foundation for admission of the statements made during the call.