Albuquerque Criminal Lawyer Blog

A recent case from the New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed the validity of the consent to a search under the 4th Amendment. The case of State v. Norman Davis involved the search of an individual's property for marijuana.

In a joint operation, the New Mexico State Police, the New Mexico National Guard and officers from a number of other law enforcement agencies entered Mr. Davis' property to investigate the presence of marijuana. The numerous officers were heavily armed with handguns and AR-15 semi-automatic weapons. In addition, the operation included two Army National Guard helicopters which were hovering over the residence at the time that contact was made with Mr. Davis.

Mr. Davis had a greenhouse on his property. The investigation began as a result of helicopter surveillance that suggested the presence of marijuana in the greenhouse. The greenhouse had an opaque finish so it was not possible to view its contents from outside the greenhouse which raises some questions regarding the validity of the initial suspicion.

Against this backdrop, Mr. Davis was asked for consent to search his greenhouse. Mr. Davis asked the officer if he had to consent to which the officer responded "No", but it would take less than 30 minutes to obtain a warrant during which time Mr. Davis' property would be secured. During this conversation, the many other officers were scattered across Mr. Davis property to which Mr. Davis commented that it looked like they were already searching anyway.

Mr. Davis moved for suppression of the evidence arguing that the consent was invalid because it was not voluntary. His motion was denied. As a result, Mr. David entered a conditional plea reserving the right to appeal the illegal search and seizure question.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals found that there was no voluntary consent to the search. The Court laid out three requirements for voluntary consent to a search:

"First, the consent must be unequivocal and specific, second, the consent must be given without duress or coercion, and third, the first two factors must be viewed with a presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights."

The Court found that the first requirement of a specific and unequivocal consent had been met. However, the Court determined that the second had not. Instead, the Court found that the consent had been given under duress and coercion. In holding that the consent was given under duress, the court cited the helicopters, the numerous armed law enforcement, the suggestion that refusal was futile, and the fact that from the defendant's perspective, the search was already under way.

Perhaps a more subtle approach would have been warranted under the circumstances given the fact that it was a greenhouse, not a mobile meth lab, and it was Norman Davis, not Tony Montana. In any event, a softer approach would have avoided the suppression of evidence and dismissal of the claims.

Collins & Collins, P.C.
Albuquerque Attorneys

The New Mexico Court of Appeals again addressed the issue of evidence of driving in a DWI case. The recent case of State v. Cotton is a bit hard to reconcile with the Court's other recent opinion in State v. Owelicio.

The Cotton case, like Owelicio, involved an immobile vehicle. Like Owelicio, the investigating officer found a vehicle beside the road. In Cotton, unlike Owelicio, the officer found an individual behind the wheel of the car. Along with the driver, the officer in Cotton found a female with a bloody lip, possibly a victim of domestic violence which was the impetus for the investigation to begin with. In addition, the officer found 4 small children in the car. Cotton failed the field sobriety tests. He refused the breath alcohol test which resulted in a charge of aggravated DWI. He was also charged with negligent child abuse.

Like Owelicio, the defendant made certain confessions. He confessed to drinking where Owelicio had confessed to driving despite evidence to the contrary. Cotton was convicted and appealed the verdict arguing the evidence was insufficient to support the DWI conviction. Specifically, he argued that the State had not proven that he was driving.

The State argued that it could be inferred that Cotton had been driving from the fact that the car was next to the road and Cotton neither lived in the car on the side of the road nor was it "placed there by aliens." The Court basically stated that the location of the vehicle next to the road did not prove that Cotton had been driving. He could have drank after pulling the car over. A finding of guilt required speculation on the part of the jury to find that he had been driving while intoxicated which the Court refused to allow.

The 2010 New Mexico Supreme Court case State v. Sims set forth requirements for a conviction where there was no witness to the driving but the defendant is in the vehicle. Basically, Sims requires that it be proven that defendant intended to drive the vehicle as evidenced by physical control over the vehicle. Sims makes clear that it applies only to cases premised on intent to drive, not cases such as Cotton where it is alleged that the defendant had driven in the immediate past.

Instead, the Court found the relevant case to be State v. Mailman, another 2010 New Mexico Supreme Court case. Remarkably, in the Mailman case, the officer found the defendant in the driver's seat. The car was not running and the keys were not in the ignition. However, the defendant admitted that he had been drinking and that he had thrown empty beer cans out of the vehicle while he was driving. Essentially, Mailman admitted to drinking and driving. He refused the breath alcohol test stating he was too drunk to pass. He was charged and convicted for aggravated DWI.

In Mailman, and in Cotton, the courts found that there was insufficient evidence of driving to support the DWI conviction. The Court in Mailman stated "[a]ctual physical control is not necessary to prove DWI unless there are no witnesses to the vehicle's motion and insufficient circumstantial evidence to infer that the accused actually drove while intoxicated." The Court in Mailman stated that the defendant might have been convicted based upon actual physical control and intent to drive but this had not been proven at trial. Nor had the State proven that he had driven. As result, the conviction was remanded for a new trial for the sole determination of whether he had driven in the immediate past.

The Court in Cotton, applying Mailman, found that the State had failed to prove the defendant had been driving. In addition, the State had not even attempted to prove control and intent to drive under Sims. Consequently, Cotton's conviction was reversed.

This decision is interesting in its own right. However, it is perhaps more interesting in comparison to the same Court of Appeals prior holding in State v. Owelicio. In that case, the car was on the side of the road, there was an intoxicated man changing two flat tires, and there was the defendant in the passenger seat. The passenger confessed to the DWI under protests from both the intoxicated man, who claimed a third party had been driving, and the officer who believed and told her she was lying.

The Court in Owelicio recognized that a confession alone without the corpus delicti (the act of driving while intoxicated) was insufficient. Yet the Court went to great lengths to find that the corpus delicti was established through corroborating evidence (the vehicle next to the road with 2 flat tires and 2 intoxicated individuals). The Court did not entertain the possibility that it could have been the same group of aliens that dropped Mr. Cotton's car next to the road had done likewise with the car in which witnesses had seen Owelicio traveling as a passenger? What about 2 flat tires changes the level of presumption or speculation necessary to show that Owelicio had been driving or that any DWI had occurred at all? The sequel is sure to come.

Collins & Collins, P.C.
Albuquerque Attorneys

The recent New Mexico Court of Appeals case of State v. Crane illustrates the high level of protection against unlawful search and seizure afforded those in New Mexico under the New Mexico Constitution, Article II, Section 10.

The case involved a meth lab set up in a motel room. The police received an anonymous call presumably from another guest complaining of a chemical smell emanating from the defendant's room. Two agents from the Clovis drug task force went to the motel to investigate.

Upon approaching the room, neither officer could detect a chemical odor coming from the room. While conducting surveillance of the room, the agents saw one of the residents taking garbage to the motel dumpster. The agent looked into the dumpster to view an open box with latex gloves. No other contraband was detected. However, as the agent was searching the contents of the open box behind the dumpster, an unidentified resident dumped several sealed garbage bags into the dumpster.

Without first obtaining a warrant, the agents opened the sealed garbage bags finding a variety of meth production tools and materials. The residents of the room, including Crane, were charged with trafficking methamphetamine and possession of drug
paraphernalia.

The defendant moved to suppress the evidence under the 4th Amendment and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. The trial court agreed with the defendant suppressing the evidence for illegal search and seizure under Article II, Section 10.

The Court from the outset noted that Article II, Section 10 provides greater protection than the 4th Amendment under federal law. The Court cited the divergence of the New Mexico Courts from the 1988 U.S. Supreme Court decision in California v. Greenwood where the Court found that there is no expectation of privacy in garbage. The New Mexico Court of Appeals in the 2006 case of State v. Granville rejected the argument in Greenwood that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage which is "readily accessible to any member of the public."

The Court in Granville found that "individual's garbage reveals evidence of a person's most private traits and intimate affairs." The court in Granville found that when a person places garbage in a sealed opaque bag protecting it from view, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Notably, the Granville decision dealt with garbage disposed of at a private residence, not a motel. The Court in State v. Crane refused the State's argument that motel guest have a lessened expectation of privacy in garbage dumped in the motel dumpster.

The State argued that this garbage was particularly vulnerable to intrusion by other motel guests and/or vagrants and homeless people. The court flatly rejected this reasoning stating, "There is a difference between a homeless person scavenging for food and clothes, and an officer of the [s]tate scrutinizing the contents of a garbage bag for incriminating materials."

The Court in Crane cited the 1964 U.S. Supreme Court case of Stoner v. California which long ago recognized that motel guests do not forfeit their privacy rights by virtue of checking into a motel. The Court in Stoner held that motel and hotel guests have privacy interests comparable to those in the home.

In short, motel guests are entitled to privacy as are any other citizens. In addition, contrary to federal law, private residents and motel guests alike in New Mexico have an expectation of privacy over their garbage. Thus, law enforcement must obtain a warrant prior to searching sealed garbage bags, whether at a person's home or at a motel. To do otherwise, will as here result in a suppression of the State's evidence.

Collins & Collins, P.C.
Albuquerque Attorneys

Because computers store such a large volume and variety of documents, a police search and seizure of your computer during is often a far greater intrusion on your privacy than a normal search would be. Computers can hold anything from banking records to e-mails to text documents to photos. Technology is advancing at an astounding rate, and hard drives can now store enough data to fill a warehouse.

A warrant to search your house for specific evidence doesn't give police carte blanche to search every nook and cranny for evidence of unrelated crimes. For example, a warrant to search for illegal firearms doesn't allow police to read your financial documents for evidence of tax evasion. Nor does a warrant to search your computer for specific evidence give police the right to open and examine every file on your hard drive.

This issue is still in debate, so you should consult with an Albuquerque criminal attorney with up-to-date knowledge on the latest case law, but here are some of the main arguments your attorney may wish to present that a computer search was improper.

Police can do searches for specific keywords, and computer forensic experts have advanced tools that can filter files based on different criteria. They do not need to open each file and inspect its contents to look for relevant evidence as they might do when looking through a file cabinet.

Imagine that a search warrant specifies that police can search your computer for e-mails relating to suspected fraud. E-mails stored on your computer have a identifiable file extensions. Police should not review image files or other unrelated file extensions since this would exceed the scope of the warrant. On occasion, law enforcement will stumble on to evidence of other crimes as they unlawfully peruse the contents of a suspect's computer. In cases where the scope of the warrant has been exceeded, a criminal defendant may want to challenge the scope of the search. A search may be unlawful under the 4th Amendment if it exceeds to legal scope of the warrant meriting the suppression of any illegally gathered evidence.

Because these issues are complex both legally and technologically, it may be necessary to obtain expert computer forensics assistance in figuring out exactly what transpired during the search of your computer. In order to determine the scope and legality of a search, it may be necessary to retrace the computer search. This is not a simple process requiring expert assistance which is well beyond the aptitude of most criminal defense attorneys (including this one).

Collins & Collins, P.C.
Albuquerque Attorneys

It is well established that a woman's purse is protected against unlawful search and seizure. Time and time again, the courts have ruled that "a purse is the type of container with which a person possesses the highest expectation of privacy."

The limits of these protections were tested in the recent New Mexico Court of Appeals case of State v. Tiffany Bond. In the Bonds case, the defendant was convicted on one count of possession of a controlled substance, fourth degree felony. The defendant had entered a conditional plea reserving her right to challenge the legality of the search and seizure of the evidence against her.

In a nutshell, Ms. Bond was a passenger in a stolen vehicle. The stolen car was tracked by GPS and pulled over. During the ensuring investigation, the police officer turned his sights on Ms. Bond's purse. Ms. Bonds acknowledged that the purse was hers but disavowed ownership of a smaller black bag in the purse which was visible to the officer. Due to Ms. Bond's denial of ownership of the black bag, the officer removed it from her purse, searched it and found the meth with which she was charged.

The defendant on appeal argued that she had not consented to the search of her purse and therefore the search and seizure of the black bag was illegal under the 4th Amendment and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. The state did not deny that there had been no consent to search the purse or the black bag. However, the state argued that because Ms. Bonds had disavowed ownership, no consent to the search was necessary to search the black bag. To hedge its bets, the State argued in the alternative that the search was legal under the "plain view doctrine."

The Court of Appeals disagreed on both grounds stating the search was illegal under the 4th Amendment. As such, the Court found it unnecessary to enlist the broader protections of New Mexico's Constitution.

The Court began with the basic premise that warrantless searches are presumed unreasonable with the burden on the State to prove the search reasonable. The Court shot down the argument of the State that denial of ownership necessarily waives the need for consent. The Court recognized case law to the contrary. However, in this case, the Court recognized that the denial of ownership was likely simply an attempt by the defendant to escape responsibility for the drugs in case they were discovered. The Court also recognized that disavowal of ownership of the black bag did not waive protections over the purse itself from which the bag was seized.

The Court finally addressed the State's "plain view" arguments in short order. The plain view doctrine requires that the evidence be not only plainly visible to the officer but also that the incriminating nature of the evidence be plainly apparent. Clearly, a black bag by itself does not and should not elicit suspicion sufficient for search and seizure and the Court ruled as much.

In short, a suspect admitting ownership of a purse but denying ownership to the contents does not give an officer the right to search the contents. It is not hard to imagine how a contrary ruling would lead to significant abuses by law enforcement.

Collins & Collins, P.C.
Albuquerque Attorneys

The New Mexico Supreme Court case of State v. Guthrie addresses the rights of defendants in probation violation hearings to due process and confrontation of the State's witnesses. The court determined that the rights of probationers in probation violation hearings were measured on a "sliding scale with extremes at either end and much balancing and weighing of competing interests in between."

The facts of the Guthrie case are pretty straightforward. The defendant failed to complete a residential treatment program required under the terms of his probation. The probation officer that filed the probation violation report had been relocated and was unable to attend the hearing. In her place, her supervisor testified to the contents for her report and the contents of the probation file. The supervisor had no direct knowledge of the probation violation and had never met or spoken with the defendant or the residential treatment facility.

The defendant did not dispute that he had not completed treatment and it was taken as an undisputed fact. The defendant's objections at the probation hearing were strictly related to the violation of his right to confront and cross examine his probation officer. The district court found the evidence of violation sufficient for the revocation of defendant's probation. The defendant filed an appeal arguing a violation of due process and his right to confrontation of witnesses.

The Court cited the U.S. Supreme Court Morrissey v. Brewer for the proposition that probation revocation hearings are rather informal depriving a defendant not of an absolute liberty but only a conditional liberty under the terms of probation. Because revocation of probation addresses on conditional liberties, the Court reasoned that the full spectrum of criminal trial rights do not apply.

Under Morrissey, live testimony of probation officers is not always required. Instead, the court may rely on a variety of hearsay evidence such as affidavits, depositions, and documentary evidence. The Court stated further that it had no intention of preventing the State "from developing other creative solutions" suggesting ever greater latitude for courts and prosecutors in probation violation settings.

In short, the Court in Guthrie found that the live testimony of the defendant's probation officer was not necessary. The Court also emphasized that whether or not defendant completed treatment was a simple factual determination not susceptible to subjective interpretation. The failure of the defendant to offer any rebuttal evidence to suggest otherwise weighed heavily on the Court's ruling. The Court suggested that due process and the right to confrontation might require live testimony where the violation of probation was in dispute and/or relied on more subjective criteria.

The specific findings of the case are not so troubling as the broad parameters the Court set forth for probation violations. As it stands, the due process and confrontation rights of probationers are tenuous at best. After all, a sliding scale of justice with creative prosecution is not where a defendant would like to be.

Collins & Collins, P.C.
Albuquerque Attorneys

Rule 5-503 of New Mexico District Court Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that any State witnesses be made available for pretrial interview by the defense. There are comparable rules for both Metropolitan Court and Magistrate Court. The New Mexico Court of Appeals case of State v. Curtis Harper lays down some guidelines on the application of the Rule. In so doing, it also added a significant level of confusion.

The Harper case involved charges of criminal sexual penetration of a minor. Among the State's witnesses was an expert psychologist. The State failed to make the expert available for interview by the defense despite several direct orders from the district court judge to do so. The State's reason for refusing the interview was that the defense had failed to pay the doctor's expert witness fees. The district court judge determined that Rule 5-503 overrode any such considerations and ultimately suppressed the testimony of the State's expert. The State appealed the suppression of the expert.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the State did have duty to provide the witness for interview. The Court ruled that the requirements of Rule 5-503 were unconditional. The Court ruled that once the State undertakes the duty to provide interviews, those interviews must be provided. The Court suggested that the State obtains some advantage by taking on responsibility for the interviews since the State is then present and can hear the questions asked by the defense and prepare accordingly. The State cannot both insist on participation in the pretrial interview process and refuse to make its witnesses available.

The Court specifically addressed the State's position that an expert could be withheld from the defense until expert witness fees were paid. The Court stated that this position was unacceptable and that the prosecutor could not stand as a "preemptive guarantor of the fee." The Court then stated that any prosecutor engaging in this conduct would see its case suffer the consequences.

So far so good for the defendant's 6th Amendment rights to confrontation of witnesses. It appeared the Court was moving toward a ruling that would disallow hoisting the expense of the State's experts on to the defense and that such behavior would result in the suppression of the expert's testimony. Unfortunately, the Court declined to do either.

Instead, the Court suggested that the defense could and would in fact be compelled to pay expert witness fees in order to interview the State's expert witnesses in a criminal case. In the end, the Court also stated that the failure of the State to provide the interviews in direct violation of the district court's orders to do so was not so prejudicial to the defendant as to merit suppression.

In the end, the whole judicial exercise was rendered rather meaningless. The Court in essence stated that the rules requiring the State to make witnesses available to the defense were unconditional; that an expert could not be withheld for failure to pay fees; and that the State's case would suffer in the event that it failed to abide by the rule.

After saying all this, the Court then ruled such behavior would not result in suppression. The ruling is quite puzzling as it is hard to see how the State's case has suffered despite clear violation of both the rules of procedure and the Court's own dictates. The ruling in fact simply added confusion to an already confusing area of criminal procedure.

Collins & Collins, P.C.
Albuquerque Attorneys

The New Mexico Court of Appeals has drawn strict parameters around appeals of grand jury indictments. In so doing, it appears that the reach of Jones v. Murdoch has been sharply curtailed.

In State v. Yaw, the defendants through their attorneys issued a "Murdoch letter" to the prosecutor requested certain exculpatory information be presented to the grand jury under Jones v. Murdoch. The prosecutor did not comply with the request of the defendant.

Under Jones v. Murdoch, a hearing was held by the district court judge to determine whether the evidence should be presented. The district court judge determined that the evidence need not be presented to the grand jury.

The grand jury hearing was held. The proposed exculpatory evidence was not presented. The defendants were indicted. Following the indictment, the defendants appealed.

State v. Yaw sets forth some interesting and important guidelines regarding the operation and effect of Jones v. Murdoch. The Court of Appeals drew a distinction between appeals of grand jury process and reviews of grand jury evidence.

The Court asserted that violations of grand jury process are always appealable citing such improprieties as improper persons in the grand jury room or failure to instruct on the elements of the offense. To the contrary, the Court ruled that evidentiary findings by the grand jury would not be reviewed.

This seems to be a rather odd ruling in light of Jones v. Murdoch since by definition, failure to present exculpatory evidence suggests a review of the evidence. To resolve this apparent contradiction, the Court distinguished between pre-indictment appeal and post indictment appeal then basically rules their are no rights to appeal on either.

Interestingly, the Court stated that Jones v. Murdoch provided for no appeal of the district court's ruling except under extreme circumstances on the filing of an extraordinary writ. These cases appear from the Court's ruling to be limited to cases of prosecutorial misconduct. The Court stated that the defendant must show bad faith on the part of the prosecutor in its failure to present the exculpatory evidence. Unfortunately, the Court failed to define precisely what it meant by bad faith or prosecutorial misconduct.

In light of the great deference provided to the district court in ruling on the admission of Murdoch letter evidence, the hurdle seems almost insurmountable. For all practical purposes, except in the most extreme cases, the ruling of the district court is final under State v. Yaw. Hopefully, the case will be taken up by the New Mexico Supreme Court. As it stands under Yaw, defendants are left with pretty no remedy for violations of their grand jury rights under Jones v. Murdoch.

A Nolle Prosequi or simply Nolle is considered a good outcome in a criminal case. However, this must be qualified since the Nolle is not necessarily the end of the case.

A Nolle is usually entered without prejudice. This means that the district attorney or prosecutor can re-file the charges at a later date. The Nolle will not generally toll the speedy trial rule which at the metropolitan and magistrate court levels is construed to be six months. As such, the prosecutor must re-file within the six month period.

Nolle's are typically entered when the prosecutor has been unable to make the state's witnesses available for pre-trial interview by the defense. Likewise, the prosecutor may be unable to get the state's witnesses to trial. This situation is not uncommon. It may occur in DWI cases when the officers are not available for interview and or trial. The incidence of dismissal in DWI cases has gone down significantly since the Albuquerque Police Department discontinued the DWI team concept. In the past, there would typically be two officers involved, one that made the traffic stop and another DWI unit officer who conducted the DWI investigation. The team concept required both officers presence for pre-trial interviews and for trial. If either was unavailable, the case would be dismissed.

On other occasions, critical evidence may be missing or otherwise unavailable such as police reports, witness statements, lab or test results and so on. This last situation is fairly rare but does occur on occasion. A missing police report is hard for the prosecutor to overcome. Missing witness statements may provide grounds for a dismissal or at least suppression of certain evidence. Missing lab or test results in some cases may be insurmountable for the prosecution. However, in DWI cases, missing breath or blood alcohol scores are a mere nuisance to the prosecution due to the impaired to the slightest degree standard. The breath score is simply unnecessary for a conviction if there is any admission of alcohol.

Though the Nolle is never a bad thing, it likewise is not a permanent thing until the six month speedy trial run has run. Often, upon entering a Nolle, the prosecutor will be able to collect missing evidence and locate missing witnesses. If done in a timely manner, the prosecutor can then re-file. There are those instances where the case is re-filed at the last minute just before the speedy trial rule runs. There are some judges that will not allow this practice due to the severely prejudicial effect it has on defendants. There are others that will let it slide. Unfortunately, short of appeal, the outcome may rest entirely on pure luck of the draw.

Collins & Collins, P.C.
Albuquerque Attorneys

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides limits to law enforcement search and seizure procedures in order to protect individuals' privacy. Under the 4th Amendment, unreasonable searches and seizures carried out by law enforcement officials are forbidden, Perhaps most importantly, any evidence gathered in violation of the 4th Amendment is inadmissible in Court.

The 4th Amendment prohibits police officers from entering your house or your workplace, searching your backpacks, purses, or any other private personal item, among other private matters, in the absence of either probable cause or consent to the search.

Unfortunately, the protections of the 4th Amendment do not extend to illegal searches and seizures by non-governmental agents. Essentially, individuals may be subject to unreasonable and otherwise illegal search and seizure at the hands of a host of private actors such as landlords, employers, store employees, private security guards and the like. The New Mexico Supreme Court held as much in State v. Luis Santiago.

The lack of protection means that should a later court action be commenced, whether civil or criminal, 4th Amendment rights and remedies do not generally apply. As such, illegal search and seizure may as a basis for excluding the evidence

A not too uncommon example will illustrate the point. Mall security guards can be quite aggressive. On occasion, based upon pure hunch (to be generous), they may choose to search a teenager's backpack. In so doing, contraband such as marijuana or other drugs may be discovered. Mall security may then hold the teenager until police arrive, who coincidentally are often conveniently located nearby.

Even if the security guard lacked probable cause to search the teenager's backpack, the search would not be considered illegal. Moreover, the drugs would be admissible so long as it is not found that the mall security was acting as an arm or under the direction of law enforcement.

Determining whether or not the mall security was acting under the direction of law enforcement can be challenging at best. Perhaps more problematic are situations where mall security engage in profiling or other constitutionally suspect behavior that gives rise to the search to begin with. Unfortunately, this may be far more common than we would like to believe. This type of conduct gives rise to a whole new set of issues beyond the 4th Amendment.

Collins & Collins, P.C.
Albuquerque Attorneys

The 6th Amendment's confrontation clause is crucial in criminal trials because it allows defendants to have a fair trial which the framers spelled out in the Constitution of the United States. The 6th Amendment of the Constitution protects an individual's right to confront their accuser at trial in a criminal case.

The confrontation clause bars the admission of hearsay evidence unless the out of court declarant testifies at trial. In other words, the statements of a witness or alleged victim cannot be admitted into court without the witness' or alleged victim's in-court testimony.

This is particularly important in domestic violence cases. When an alleged victim accuses a person of domestic violence, the alleged victim's and any other witness' statements can only be used against the defendant if they show up to court and testify. There are few exceptions to the rules prohibiting hearsay testimony. These rules would rarely apply in the typical domestic violence case.

At trial, the defendant has a right to cross examine the alleged victim and other State witnesses to determine the truthfulness of their statements. When an alleged victim does not show up to trial, the State usually does not have the necessary evidence to present their case.

By only presenting evidence of a crime without actually having a victim appear in court, the prosecution is attempting evidence based prosecution. Evidence based prosecution which is often attempted by prosecutors in domestic violence cases faces many challenges due to hearsay objections and confrontation issues under the 6th Amendment.

For example, prosecutors will frequently obtain the alleged victim's 911 call. As part of evidence based prosecution, the State may attempt to use the 911 tapes to prove that the defendant committed the alleged act of domestic violence such as battery or assault on a household member. In doing so, the State may argue that this is public record and try to admit this evidence.

The State is attempting to recreate the drama of the alleged incident to a jury through the 911 call. The State is also attempting to illicit statements from the 911 call which may implicate the defendant in wrong-doing. However, once the 911 operator begins to engage in any type of questioning, the statements are then testimonial hearsay and the confrontation clause bars this evidence from use at trial. Perhaps just as problematic is the identification of the caller. This issue would be raised as an objection for failure to authenticate the caller's identification.

If the State's only case is evidence based prosecution without eyewitness testimony, the State has an uphill battle when presenting its case. The prosecution will have a hard time overcoming the evidentiary objections to hearsay and authentication.

Collins & Collins, P.C.
Albuquerque Attorneys

The "knock and announce" rule that has arisen under the 4th Amendment protections against unlawful search and seizure requires officers to wait a reasonable amount of time for an occupant's response before resorting to forcible entry. The amount of time that is reasonable is dependent upon the circumstances.

In State v. Ulibarri, the New Mexico Court of Appeals found that 10 to 12 seconds was insufficient under the circumstances of the case. In Ulibarri, the defendant was convicted on a conditional plea to felony possession of heroin and cocaine. The evidence was seized during the search of the defendant's grandfather's home. The defendant was not present at the time of the search. He was already in custody. The only occupant at the time of the search was the defendant's 75 year old grandfather.

It was admitted by the 12 member police team that executed the warrant that they waited only 10 to 12 seconds after knocking and announcing before kicking in the door. Unfortunately, the grandfather who was trying to get to the door was knocked down and injured as the door struck him.

The Court spelled out the purposes of the "knock and announce" rule which is to prevent the needless destruction of property, avoid violence toward both the police and the occupants, to protect individual privacy, and particularly relevant here, to avoid unnecessary injury to the occupants. Failure to abide by the rule results in the suppression of the evidence.

The State in its appeal argued that it was customary to wait only 10 to 12 seconds based upon a couple of cases involving hotel rooms and mobile homes. The Court distinguished these cases stating that 10 to 12 seconds might be reasonable in such small quarters. The Court further distinguished these cases since the suspects were known to be present during these forced entries.

The State further argued that exigent circumstances will allow for shorter waiting times to protect officer safety. However, the Court pointed out that the State had not argued exigent circumstances at trial but rather that 10 to 12 seconds was by law a sufficient waiting period.

The Court emphasized that there were no bright line rules for proper waiting period. Instead the reasonableness of the wait is viewed under the totality of the circumstances. Most importantly, the Court reaffirmed that it is the State's burden to "show the reasonableness of the execution of the warrant." In this case, the Court determined the State had not met its burden and therefore the conviction of Mr. Ulibarri was reversed.

Parrish Collins
Albuquerque Attorney
www.CollinsAttorneys.com

Officers in DWI investigations must follow the guidelines established by the New Mexico Scientific Laboratory Division (SLD) in the administration of the breath alcohol tests. Failure to strictly adhere to the guidelines will invalidate the breath alcohol scores.

In State v. Ybarra, the New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed a situation where the officer failed to obtain 2 breath alcohol samples despite the defendant's willingness to provide the samples. The defendant was having a difficult time completing the test as a result of his asthma. The officer actually held an asthma inhaler for the defendant as the defendant was handcuffed. The officer then decided to terminate the breath alcohol test determining that the defendant was unable to provide a second breath sample.

The Court ruled that the circumstances of the case did not justify termination of the breath alcohol test stating, "Terminating a breath test and using the result from the single completed sample must be based on more than a police officer's belief that the willing test subject has physical difficulties blowing into the machine." The court made it clear that DWI officers must comply SLD mandated two breath samples. The only exception to this requirement is when the defendant is physically incapable or refuses to consent to the second test.

Failure to obtain two breath alcohol samples in the absence of incapacity or refusal will result in the suppression of the breath score. The prosecutor cited the 2005 case of State v. Vaughn to suggest that DWI officer's may exercise discretion in terminating the tests. The court recognized that a officer might terminate the test where the defendant intentionally gives a bad sample as in Vaughn. However, the court determined that there was no such evidence of an intentionally bad sample by defendant. Instead, the defendant attempted to give the sample even as the officer held his asthma inhaler for him while he was handcuffed.

The court further cited the 1998 case of State v. Gardner for the proposition strict compliance with the SLD regulations is required. Good faith attempts at compliance are not enough. Gardner involved a case where the officer had failed to observe the defendant for the SLD required 20 minute observation period when the defendant was allowed to go to the bathroom. Despite the apparent good faith of the officer, the breath alcohol scores were suppressed for failure to adhere to the SLD regulations.

The court in its rulings recognizes the importance of standardized guidelines in the administration of the breath alcohol tests to insure legitimate and accurate tests results. Perhaps in this case, the officer did exercise good faith in terminating the tests. However, the absence of strict guidelines could lead to any number of possible abuses in the administration of the tests. After all, how is good faith to be measured in the absence of rules?

Parrish Collins
Albuquerque Attorney
www.CollinsAttorneys.com

In State v. Toms, the New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed the foundational requirements for admission of breath alcohol score results in a DWI trial. The Court in Toms reiterated the ruling in the 2007 New Mexico Supreme Court case of State v. Martinez. In addition, the Court expanded on Martinez in addressing the proper procedural grounds by which a defendant may attack the foundation of the breath alcohol results.

The Court first stated that calibration of the machine by the officer was not enough. Though calibration of the machine is a measure to insure the accuracy of the breath alcohol score, it is insufficient to establish the foundation for admission of the score into evidence at trial. In addition, as stated in Martinez, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the machine has been properly certified and the certification is current at the time of the test. The State in short must show that the machine has been properly certified, the certification is current, and the machine was certified by the Scientific Laboratory Division of the Department of Health (SLD).

Failure to fully establish the foundation for admission of the breath alcohol score will render the evidence inadmissible. These foundational requirements are meant to insure the accuracy of the breath alcohol scores and to protect defendants against unreliable or inaccurate tests results. The State argued that the defendant must raise the issue prior to trial. Effectively, the State argued that the defendant was obligated to alert the State to weaknesses in its case prior to trial in essence providing the State with the opportunity to cure the defect.

Fortunately, the Court disagreed. This foundation is the State's responsibility, not the defendant's. The Court expressly expanded on Martinez to address the State's argument. The Court stated that the defendant has no obligation to raise the deficiency in the State's case via pre-trial motion as the trial court and the State had suggested. The Court stated that the state has the burden of laying the foundation for the breath alcohol test results and that the Court would not "require the defense to file a pretrial motion simply to advise the prosecution that it may have a defect in its proof or some problem in establishing the appropriate evidentiary foundation."

DWI is enforced very vigorously in New Mexico for good reason. DWI is a threat to the safety of all of us and our families who drive New Mexico roads. However, on occasion, DWI is perhaps enforced a little too vigorously as was the recently invalidate practice of arresting drivers who were sleeping in their cars, and the continuing practice of arresting and prosecuting drivers at breath alcohol levels below .08. Fortunately, the Court in State v. Tom has not shifted the burden of prosecution to the defendant him or herself by placing the responsibility of foundational elements to the defendant. After all, the defendant should not carry the burden of prosecuting him or herself despite the efficiencies that would come from such a requirement.

Parrish Collins
Albuquerque Attorney
www.CollinsAttorneys.com

The New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of a "reach-in" search of a defendant on a busy street in the recent case of State v. Williams. The court found that the search was an unlawful invasion of privacy under the circumstances and therefore and illegal search and seizure under the 4th Amendment.

In a nutshell, there was a felony warrant outstanding on the defendant. The officer legally pulled the defendant over in his car. The officer legally placed the defendant under arrest due to the warrant. The officer then pulled out the defendant's waist-band on his pants looking in and seizing crack cocaine in the defendant's pants. The search and seizure was conducted in broad daylight on a busy city street. The defendant argued the search constituted an illegal strip. The Court disagreed that it was a strip search. However, the Court still found the search to be unreasonable under the circumstances and therefore unconstitutional.

The issue that arose was not whether the officer was entitled to search the defendant. All parties agreed that the officer had the right to search the defendant. However, the manner of the search was found to be unreasonable and unconstitutional under the 4th Amendment. The Court recognized that there are situations where the suspect's sense of modesty and privacy are overridden by exceptional circumstances. However, the cases all indicated that reasonable steps must be taken to protect the suspect's privacy. The Court stated that there was must a proper balance between the immediate need to search the suspect and the invasion of privacy and embarrassment associated with a public search.

In State v. Williams, the search was conducted in broad daylight during rush hour. No evidence was presented by the State showing that appropriate steps were taken to lessen the invasion of the defendant's privacy or that the situation dictated an immediate search in the manner it was conducted. In fact, according to the Court, the trial court did not consider at all the reasonableness of the location or the manner of the search.

Because the State failed to show the reasonableness of the search, or necessity under the circumstances, the search was found to be illegal and the crack cocaine was suppressed. Many will take objection to the ruling. The ruling may seem to run against common sense. However, the New Mexico courts are very protective of constitutional rights often extending protections well beyond the federal courts in similar situations. And the simple fact is the officer could have waited and conducted a full strip search once the suspect was taken to jail. The search as conducted simply was not necessary and some very basic steps could have protected both the defendant's right to privacy as well as the officer's seizure of evidence.

Parrish Collins
Albuquerque Attorney
www.CollinsAttorneys.com