Albuquerque Criminal Lawyer Blog

Broad discovery is fundamental to due process in the defense of criminal charges. The New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed the issue in State v. Ortiz. The court stated that a defendant is entitled to all discovery that might reasonably relate to the defense. The defendant need not know in advance that the records, documents or other evidence are helpful, but only that they might possibly be helpful to the defense.

Ortiz involved a DWI stop. The officer stated in grand jury testimony that he stopped the defendant due to erratic driving behavior. Through discovery, the State provided a videotape of the incident. However, the video was missing 6 minutes of footage. The defendant insisted that the State provide the excised portion of the tape. The State refused stating that the missing portion was irrelevant to the case. The defendant also requested the officer's cell phone records for the missing 6 minute period. Again, the State refused stating that the officer had an expectation of privacy in his personal cell phone records.

The district court ordered the State to provide both the missing video footage as well as the officer's cell phone records for the six minute period. The State refused. The Court, exercising its discretionary authority for discovery violations, suppressed all evidence arising from the DWI stop which resulted in dismissal of the case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case.

The Court of Appeals reiterated the liberal discovery standard in criminal cases. The court cited United States v. Lloyd, a 1993 D.C. Circuit Court case, as follows: the "materiality standard...is not a heavy burden; rather, evidence is material as long as there is a strong indication that it will play an important role in uncovering admissible evidence, aiding witness preparation , corroborating testimony or assisting impeachment or rebuttal."

The Court agreed with the district court that both the missing video footage and the officer's cell phone records during the missing 6 minutes might play a role in the defense. It was not up to the defendant to prove the materiality of the evidence. Instead, the defendant had the right to obtain and review the evidence for its materiality. The court indicated that liberal discovery was fundamental to the defendant's due process rights and his right to a fair trial.

The Court's ruling as well as the liberal rules of discovery are essential to the defense. In addition, they reflect plain common sense. A defendant would hardly be entitled to any discovery if it were required that he or she first show the materiality of the evidence before obtaining it. The materiality of evidence often cannot be known until it has been reviewed. In many cases, a review of the evidence may find that it is immaterial or otherwise inadmissible. But due process dictates that all potentially material or relevant evidence be disclosed. Only then can a determination of admissibility be undertaken. It takes little imagination to envision potential abuse of a less stringent discovery rule.

Parrish Collins
Albuquerque Attorney
www.CollinsAttorneys.com

The 10th Circuit Court Appeals addressed the 6th Amendment Right to a speedy trial in U.S. v. Seltzer. Though the constitutional protections under New Mexico law are typically more expansive than federal law, the 10th Circuit in the Seltzer case appears more respectful of the 6th Amendment than the recent New Mexico Supreme Court decision of State v. Garza.

In State v. Garza, the court set forth a sliding scale related to a criminal defendant's right to a speedy trial in New Mexico. The court suggested speedy trial parameters as follows: 1) 12 months for simple cases, 2) 15 months for cases with intermediate complexity, and 2) 18 months for complex cases. The New Mexico Supreme Court even allowed for some leeway in the these standards by stating that these time limits were mere thresholds for further inquiry.

The 10th Circuit in U.S. v. Seltzer set forth a number of considerations in the determination of whether or not a defendant's right to a speedy trial have been violated. The Court stated that a delay of more than one year from the date of arrest or indictment, whichever is earlier, was "presumptively prejudicial" to the defense. The court noted that in particularly complex cases, longer delays, even a two year delay might not be unreasonable. The court noted further that in straightforward cases, even a minor delay might be considered prejudicial and unreasonable.

The Court found that the charges against the defendant Seltzer related to counterfeiting, drug possession, and firearm possession by a felon were not complex and a delay of more than one year was presumptively unreasonable. The Court stated that even lesser delays might prove prejudicial in cases involving eyewitness testimony.

Once the presumption of prejudice has been found, it is up to the State to "provide an inculpable explanation for delays in speedy trial claims." The Court cited the 1972 United States Supreme Court case of Barker v. Wingo as follows: "A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay." Thus the burden quickly shifts to the State to show a legitimate reason for any delay impacting the defendant's speedy trial rights. This burden becomes harder to meet in cases involving simple charges.

Unlike the New Mexico Court in State v. Garza, there is a heavy burden on the State to justify any delay impacting the defendant's 6th Amendment right to a speedy trial. New Mexico typically zealously protects the constitutional rights of its citizens. The protections under New Mexico's Constitution are generally much broader than under federal law. In State v. Garza, the burden appears to be on the defendant to prove prejudice, rather than on the State where the burden belongs. Hopefully, the New Mexico Supreme Court will take the lead of the 10th and revisit the 6th Amendment rights that are so important to due process and a fair trial.

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There are often delays in indictment on felony cases in Albuquerque, and throughout New Mexico. We often get questions regarding the legality of the delay in indictment following the first appearance.

When a felony action is commenced in Albuquerque, the case typically begins in the Metropolitan Court on a first appearance. During the first appearance, the court will address the statement of probable cause. The burden for probable cause is pretty low at this stage. The statement of probable cause need only establish that a crime was committed and that logically a jury could find the defendant guilty based upon that statement if true.

It is rare that the court would find probable cause lacking. In cases where probable cause is found, the Albuquerque Metropolitan Court judge will first address bond. Assuming that bond has been satisfied, the judge will set 60 day conditions of release. These conditions are fairly routine such as no further violations of the law, no contact with the alleged victim, no return to the scene of the crime, no deadly weapons, no drugs or alcohol, and no leaving the County without approval of the Court.

Many people accused of crimes believe that once the 60 days is up, the State is barred from taking the case to grand jury. That is not the case. The only consequence of failing to take the case to grand jury within the 60 day conditions of release is that those conditions lapse. The State is still free to bring the charges at a later date, and unfortunately for the defendant over whom the charges are hanging, often a much later date.

The only deadlines for getting the case to grand jury and formal charges filed is the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for criminal cases in New Mexico are quite lengthy as set forth in by statute as follows:

• • Capital or 1st degree violent felony - no limitation,
• • 2nd degree felony - 6 years from the date of the crime,
• • 3rd or 4th degree felony - 5 years from the date of the crime,
• • Misdemeanor - 2 years from the date of the crime, and
• • Petty Misdemeanor - 1 year from the date of the crime.

These deadlines are pretty lengthy so that a delay generally does not mean much regarding the intentions of the District Attorney. However, in less serious cases, no news is good news. In the meantime, if you are in this situation, you should keep your head down and avoid any contact with law enforcement. This means at a minimum staying out of trouble. It would be unfortunate to raise a red flag on an old case due to subsequent violations of the law.

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Federal prosecution for immigration violations reached a record high of 169,612 in 2009. According to the study out of Syracuse University, this number represents more than ½ of all criminal cases brought by the federal government.

Prosecution of immigration violations is up by almost 16% and reflects the Bush era policies of strict and speedy enforcement of the immigration laws. Many of the cases represent illegal reentry cases. Others related relate to crime related bases for removal and deportation. The Bush administration greatly increased the number of I.C.E (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) agents, Border Patrol agents, and federal prosecutors for purposes of enforcement.

Much of the increase is also, according the New York Times, related to the Department of Justice program Operation Streamline which relies on speedy and large-scale processing of plea bargains in immigration cases. It is suggested that the Department of Justice goes after the relatively simple immigration cases since these cases are very rapidly processed and closed compared to other cases. White-collar criminal cases take an average of 460 days for disposition. Narcotics cases take 333 days. By contrast, the immigration cases typically reach disposition in 2 days.

The success of the Operation Streamline program has now met with constitutional challenges particularly in Arizona which accounted for more than 22,000 of the federal criminal immigration cases in 2009. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled in U.S. v. Roblero-Solis that the process of mass pleadings is a violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding the taking of pleas in federal court. Interestingly, despite the finding by the court that the plea process was a violation of Rule 11 which fundamentally a Due Process protection, the convictions in the case were upheld since the defendants failed to show that the process affected their decisions to enter the pleas.

The growth in the number of immigration prosecutions shows that the Obama Administration is equally serious about immigration enforcement. In fact, the data from the Syracuse study indicate that the rate of prosecution has accelerated. These numbers appear to conflict with the Administration's public statements regarding immigration reform. Perhaps, the tough position on enforcement is seen as necessary for progress on future reform.

In any event, it is clear that immigration enforcement will remain a high priority at the Department of Justice for some time to come. In addition, though the mass plea process under Operation Streamline is a violation of Rule 11, it appears that the process will stand in light of the ruling in Roblero-Solis.

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In U.S. v. Pena-Montes, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the legality of questioning under the 4th Amendment of an individual following a traffic stop. The case involved the prosecution of the defendant Jose Luis Pena-Montes for illegal reentry into the United States following his arrest following the traffic stop.

During the course of the traffic stop based upon the officer's belief that the car in which Pena-Montes was a passenger lacked dealer plates. Upon further investigation, the officer determined that the car did have dealer plates. However, he wrongfully believed that the use of dealer plates was restricted to certain times of day. Because there had been auto thefts from Albuquerque car dealers in the recent past, he suspected that the vehicle was stolen.

Due to his suspicions, he continued to question the driver. He then turned his questioning to Pena-Montes questioning him on his identity. Pena-Montes gave false and misleading answers regarding his identify. Due to the false identity provided by Pena-Montes, the officer arrested him for concealing identity.

Upon arrest, Pena-Montes was transported to and identified by Albuquerque Police identification. Upon identification, it was determined through the NCIC national database that he had previously been convicted of a felony in California and subsequently deported.

Based upon these findings, Pena-Montes was indicted on one count of illegal reentry of a removed alien following a felony conviction in violation of 8 U.S.C. §1326(a) and (b). Pena-Montes moved for suppression of all evidence derived from the traffic stop, including his identity. The district court denied his Motion finding that the questioning following the stop was not illegal under the 4th Amendment.

The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court holding that the officer had violated the 4th Amendment by continuing to question the occupants of the vehicle once the basis for the stop, illegal plates, was found to me missing. The Court provided an excellent analysis of search and seizure law in New Mexico

The court began by citing the 2008 10th Circuit case of United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez for the assertion that "A routine traffic stop is indisputably a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Citing United States v. Winder (10th Cir. 2009), the Court set forth the requirements under Terry v. Ohio that the stop must be justified at its inception and the resulting detention must be reasonably related to the basis for the stop.

Under this standard, the Court found that the continuing questioning of both the driver and Pena-Montes did violate the 4th amendment prohibitions against illegal search & seizure since questioning continued following the determination that the basis for the stop proved to be lacking. Unfortunately, this may not have saved Pena-Montes as will be seen in part II of this blog.

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The felony process can be pretty confusing for accused persons in Albuquerque and throughout New Mexico. In addition, the process differs from county to county. The process below applies to the process followed by the district attorney's office in Albuquerque.

A felony criminal action may begin with an arrest or a felony warrant. If you are arrested, you are taken into custody until your first appearance or until you are able to post bond. If you are able to post bond, then you are released pending the first appearance which will generally occur within a few days of your release.

If you are unable to post bond, then the prosecutor must take the case to the grand jury within 10 days of arrest. Failure to bring the case to grand jury within 10 days will result in release from custody. It does not mean the case goes away. It simply means that the State must release you from custody pending the grand jury investigation.

If you are able to post bond, the case will be set for first appearance. At the first appearance, the prosecutor will present a statement of probable cause outlining the charges against you. The statement of probable cause requires no presentation of evidence. The defendant may dispute probable cause but again the statement is taken at face value and the statements very rarely fail to state adequate probable cause for the arrest. It is simply a statement of the case by the prosecutor or the arresting officer. These are taken at face value by the judge.

Assuming the judge finds probable cause, the judge will then set conditions of release and bail. The conditions of release for felony cases typically include the following terms:

1. The defendant may no possess firearms or dangerous weapons,
2. The Defendant will not return to the location of the alleged incident,
3. The Defendant will not possess or consume alcohol/illegal drugs or enter liquor establishments,
4. The Defendant will not violate federal, state or local criminal law,
5. The Defendant notify the Court of any change of address,
6. The Defendant will not leave the jurisdictional county of the court,
7. The Defendant will maintain contact with his or her attorney,
8. The Defendant will have no contact with the alleged victim or any witnesses,
9. The Defendant will no drive without a valid license.

The conditions of release continue for 60 days or until the date of arraignment if the Defendant is eventually indicted. This does not mean the case goes away after 60 days if the prosecutor has not indicted the Defendant by that time. It simply means the conditions of release lapse.

The prosecutor has very liberal time limits on obtaining the indictment. The only limitation is set by the statute of limitations which are very long in criminal cases. On rare occasions, a Motion to Dismiss for pre-indictment delay may be filed but these are very difficult to win.

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The United States Supreme Court finds that the 6th Amendment right to confrontation requires that an analyst who tested drugs in the lab must testify in court to get those lab results entered into evidence. This important case will impact both drug cases and DWI/DUI cases in Albuquerque and throughout New Mexico.

The United States Supreme Court case of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts involved the introduction of evidence by the prosecution of laboratory certificates from the state laboratory regarding cocaine connected to the defendant. The analyst that conducted the testing of the cocaine was not present at trial.

The defendant objected to the admission of the lab certificate without in-court testimony by the lab analyst. The defendant argued that the practice was a violation of the 6th Amendment confrontation clause as set forth in the 2004 Supreme Court case Crawford v. Washington.

The United States Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts agreed that the practice of admitting lab certificates in lieu of or in the absence of foundational testimony was a violation of the confrontation clause as set forth in Crawford.

The court rejected the prosecution's arguments that these analyst were not accusatory witnesses. The court stated that there was no exemption from the confrontation clause for those witnesses testifying to facts other those observed at the crime scene. The court found any witness who offers his testimony is subject to the confrontation clause.

The court also refused the prosecution's argument that these certificates are excluded from the hearsay rules as official business record. Likewise, the Court refused the argument that these lab analysts are neutral and unbiased simply applying scientific methods to the substance in question. Finally, the court stated that it was immaterial that the defendant himself could have subpoenaed the analyst to court holding that it was the State's burden to bring their witnesses to court for foundational purposes.

The Melendez case could have significant impact on cases throughout the State of New Mexico. It appears that the ruling will cover the admission of lab results from New Mexico's scientific lab division in both drug cases and DWI/DUI cases. The cases are winding their way through the New Mexico courts now as the Courts here attempt to deal with the Melendez-Diaz rulings.

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The recent New Mexico Supreme Court case of State v. Joshua Garcia makes clear that Article II, Section 10 of New Mexico's Constitution extends greater protection from illegal search and seizure than that set forth in the 1991United States Supreme Court case of California v. Hodari D.

State v. Garcia involved a domestic violence call whereby the caller indicated that she wanted an individual named Joshua Garcia removed from her home. Upon responding to the call, the officer saw a man walking across the street near the caller's address. The officer immediately flashed his spot light on the unidentified man and told the man to stop. The officer had no prior knowledge of the identification of the defendant. Garcia continued walking past the patrol car and which point the officer again instructed him to stop. Garcia ignored the instructions of the officer and continued walking. The officer sprayed Garcia twice with pepper spray. As Garcia continued walking, the officer saw something fall from his pocket at which time the officer tackled and handcuffed Garcia. The article that fell from Garcia's pocket was identified as crack cocaine.

Garcia was charged which possession of crack cocaine. The question that arose was whether the evidence of crack cocaine should be excluded from evidence as the fruit of an illegal search and seizure by the officer. The District Court refused to suppress the evidence under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. Garcia pled guilty to the charges reserving his right to challenge the court's suppression ruling.

The Court followed the ruling set forth in the 1997 New Mexico Supreme Court case of State v. Gomez. State v. Gomez explicitly recognized that New Mexico's constitutional protections could at times exceed the protections afforded under federal law. Upon applying the law set forth in Gomez, the Court found in Garcia that New Mexico's Constitution, Article II, Section 10 provided greater protection than that set forth in Hodari D.

In Hodari D, officers drove up on a group of youths huddled together. Upon seeing the patrol unit, the youth took flight. The officers pursued the youth on foot. During the pursuit, one of the youth discarded a rock of crack cocaine. The officer tackled the youth and recovered the discarded crack. The United States Supreme Court found that the youth was not seized at the time the crack was discarded. The Court determined that a seizure is defined by the reaction of the suspect. Because the suspect fled, there was no seizure despite the fact that the pursuit lacked any reasonable basis from its inception. Because there was no seizure, the evidence was not illegally seized.

The New Mexico Court in Garcia reverted back to the law as previously set forth by the United States Supreme Court in the 1980 case of U.S. v. Mendenhall. Mendenhall stated that a person is seized when a reasonable person under the circumstance would not feel free to leave. Utilizing the Mendenhall standard, and the protections set forth in Article II, Section 10, the Court found that Joshua Garcia was illegally seized at the moment the officer shown his spot on him and commanded him to stop. Because there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop, the search and seizure that ensued was illegal, and the crack cocaine should have been excluded from evidence.

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The 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution reads:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The 4th Amendment protections against unlawful search and seizure rests on the right to privacy proving protection against unlawful and abusive law enforcement practices that would invade that right to privacy. The protections of the 4th Amendment are broad and complex. Entire books are written on the 4th Amendment, and there are legal scholars that spend much of their careers studying and writing about the 4th Amendment. Many of the most important cases in criminal law and criminal procedure derive from the 4th Amendment as do the rights of criminal defendants.

The importance of the protections afforded under the 4th Amendment cannot be over-stated. The 4th Amendment protects at every stage of a criminal case from the initial stop by the officer, to the search of the suspect's vehicle, home, property or other belongings both before, during or after the arrest, and of course to the arrest itself.

The 4th Amendment provides protection in all variety of encounters with law enforcement. The protections stretch from the petty shoplifting offense, to DWI/DUI stops and investigations to the most serious felony offenses. Violations of the 4th Amendment have serious consequences including the exclusion of evidence seized illegally. Often, the exclusion of illegally seized evidence will result in the dismissal of the charges in whole or in part. Should the prosecutor refuse to dismiss based upon the lack of evidence, the exclusion of the illegally seized evidence can be an insurmountable obstacle for the prosecution at trial.

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Once past the due process issues presented by the confidential informant's mental health and prescription drug issues, the Court in U.S. v. Robinson went on to address the confrontation issues under the 6th Amendment raised by the trial court's refusal to allow the defense attorney to cross examine the confidential informant at trial on those issues.

The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals found that the district court had indeed violated the Confrontation Clause under the 6th Amendment when it forbade the defense from cross-examining the CI on his mental health history and use of prescription medications. Further, the court found that the prosecutor had failed to meet the high burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that these constitutional errors were not harmless errors.

The Court stated that the 6th Amendment guarantees the right of a defendant to "be confronted with the witnesses against him." The primary right under the Confrontation Clause is the right to confront and cross examine the State's witnesses. And though the trial court may exercise its discretion through "reasonable limits" on the scope of questioning, cross examination is the primary means by which the credibility of witnesses is determined by the jury.

The Court found that the trial court had not violated the Confrontation Clause on the issue of illegal drug use since it allowed the defense to cross examine the confidential informant on these issue. However, the prohibition against cross examination of the confidential informant on his mental health issues and related prescription drug use violated the defendant's right to confrontation since the cross examination on the illegal drug use may have been much different with full access and knowledge to the informant's mental health records.

The Court stated, "Where the witness the accused seeks to cross-examine is the 'star' government witness, providing an essential link in the prosecution's case, the importance of full cross-examination to disclose possible bias is necessarily increased." The Court stated further that "a constitutional violation occurs when the defendant is prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination that, as a result, precludes him from eliciting information from which jurors could draw vital inferences in his favor."

In short, the informant's credibility was essential to the government's case. The defendant had a right to put the informant's credibility before the jury and the jury's view of his credibility was critical to the outcome of the case for both sides. Preclusion of the defense's review and cross examination on issues of mental health and drug use was a fundamental violation of both due process and the right to confrontation of witnesses.

The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of confidential informants in U.S. Robinson. The defendant was charged as being a felon in possession of a firearm after allegedly selling a gun to the confidential informant. The Court addressed the issues of due process and the right to confrontation of witnesses.

The confidential information had serious mental health issues including the use of several prescription drugs. The Court reviewed the medical file in camera but refused to allow defense counsel to access the records. The Court found that the Court's refusal to allow the defense attorney access to medical file was a violation of due process under the 5th Amendment.

The court determined that the Court's restrictions resulted in the jury seeing an incomplete and inaccurate picture of the confidential informant's credibility. From the perspective of the jury, the confidential informant had only "a little bit" of a drug problem. Moreover, the jury never heard of the repeated violations of the confidential informant's agreement with the ATF by using drugs. By the prosecutor's version
of events, the confidential informant had reformed since becoming an ATF informant. had largely reformed himself after becoming an ATF informant. Finally, the confidential informant had singifnicant memory issues related to the events which he attributed to a lapse of time. The jury was unable to judge his credibility independently based upon the mental health and drug issues.

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. The 5th Amendment's primary protection is that of a fundamentally fair trial. This requires that all material evidence be admitted. This does not necessarily mean that
the withheld records would have resulted in acquittal. The Court stated instead, that
"the touchstone is simply whether the ultimate verdict is one 'worthy of
confidence."

Having addressed the due process issues under the 5th Amendment, the Court went on to address confrontation issues under the 6th Amendment.

The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals reinforces the long held and cherished 4th Amendment right against unlawful search and seizure in the unlawful intrusion by police into an Albuquerque home.

In Manzanares v. Higdon, Albuquerque Police officers came to the home of the Defendant Manzanares for the purpose of investigating Manzanares' co-worker in a rape case. The Albuquerque Police Officers first arrived at the home of Manzanares at 5:50 AM in the morning. From the beginning, Manzanares was very cooperative with the Albuquerque Police officers, allowing them into them into his home, and providing helpful information into the identify and location of the alleged rapist. The police continued with the interrogation for hours on end until finally Manzanares asked that the police leave his home. The police refused to leave, instead handcuffing Manzanares as they continued to interrogate him.

Manzanares brought a civil lawsuit against the police under the 4th Amendment for Illegal Search & Seizure. The jury ruled in favor of Albuquerque Police Officer Higdon on all counts. Manzanares filed a Motion of Judgment as a Matter of Law. This Motion was denied by the trial court. Manzanares filed an appeal to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. The 10th ruled in favor of Manzanares that his 4th Amendment rights were violated as a matter of law.

The police officers argued that officers argued the encounter constituted an investigative stop and that his detention was needed to prevent his interference with the investigation. The Court was not persuaded putting great emphasis on the fact that the seizure occurred in Manzanares home. The Court recognized that Manzanares consented to the entry of the police into his home. However the court stressed that his consent could be withdrawn at any time. The refusal of the Albuquerque Police officers to leave once consent was withdrawn amounted to an illegal arrest without probable cause in violation of the search and seizure clause in 4th Amendment.

The Court emphasized the sanctity of the home stating, " It has been clear for nearly thirty years that a warrantless entry into a home...is presumptively unreasonable. The Supreme Court has consistently reiterated the famous refrain that a man's home is his castle and has preserved the home as the center of the Fourth Amendment's protections."

The court found that reasonable police officers would have recognized that their refusal to leave upon withdrawal of consent constituted a seizure. There was no warrant, no probable cause to believe a crime had been committed, and no extraordinary circumstances to justify their continued presence in Manzanares' home against his wishes. Once his consent to their presence was withdrawn, their refusal to leave was a violation of the 4th Amendment.

Miranda warnings are required whenever there has been a formal arrest or a restraint of movement indicating a formal arrest. The recent New Mexico Court of Appeals decision in State v. Hernandez makes it clear that there is no such formal arrest or restraint when the suspect voluntarily converses with a police officer over the phone.

In the case of State v. Hernandez, the police were called to a home that had been receiving repeated threatening phone calls. Following each phone call, the caller allegedly fired shots into the home. Upon arrival of the officers, the caller called the home again. The officer answered the phone. The Defendant's phone number was indicated on caller ID. The caller then made incriminating statements including identifying himself as Roberto and confirming he was the shooter.

At trial, the Defendant's attorneys were successful in suppressing the statements of the Defendant as a violation of the Defendant's Miranda rights. Miranda v. Arizona requires that the suspect be under interrogation while in custody. The Court found that Hernandez was neither in custody nor under interrogation as he voluntarily initiated the phone call as well as the conversation. He was free to hang up the phone. Instead, he made the statements voluntarily.

The lesson here is clear: Stop Talking and Hang Up the Phone. It is exceedingly unwise to voluntarily give incriminating statements to a police officer over the phone particularly when you initiated the call. Miranda will not protect you here.

There were other issues regarding the rights of the Defendant to confront witnesses under Crawford v. Washington. The Court remanded the case to District Court for a determination of facts necessary for the Crawford determination including the identification of the caller, and the related foundation for admission of the statements made during the call.

A criminal defendant has a right to confront and cross examine the State's witnesses under the 6th Amendment. This is the chief weapon for domestic violence defendants in Albuquerque and throughout New Mexico. The refusal of the alleged victim to testify is the basis for the great majority of the dismissal of these types of cases. Unfortunately for defendants, this option may be very limited in the future as a result of the New Mexico Court of Appeals ruling in State v. Soliz.

The U.S. Supreme Court of Crawford v. Washington made the right to confrontation of witnesses more explicit when it ruled that a defendant has a right to confront any testimonial witness. The Court stated that when the witness is unavailable, any out of court testimonial statement made by that witness is inadmissible. The question becomes what is "testimonial"? Crawford set out some guidelines with the basic premise being whether or not the statements were given with an eye toward prosecution of the defendant.

The U.S. Supreme Court in Davis v. Washington set further guidelines on the term "testimonial." The Court in Davis stated that statements are non-testimonial if they are given with the primary purpose of assisting the police in an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when there is no such ongoing emergency, and the primary purpose of the statement is to provide information potentially relevant to a subsequent criminal prosecution.

The New Mexico Court of Appeals in State v. Soliz had an opportunity to address the definition of testimonial witness in a domestic violence setting. State v. Soliz involved a domestic violence call to 911. Soliz girlfriend was frantic and crying when she told the 911 operator that Soliz had just attacked her, he had fled, he had pursued her with the instrument with which he had attacked her, and he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

The Court in Soliz followed Davis fining that the statements by Soliz' girlfriend were non-testimonial since made in an emergency situation for the purpose of gaining assistance from the police. Because they were non-testimonial, they were fully admissible at trial despite her unavailability. In fact, the girlfriend refused to testify or otherwise cooperate in the prosecution of Soliz. This frequently occurs in domestic violence cases.

The ruling in Soliz poses some real potential problems for domestic violence defendants in the future. In essence, Soliz will allow the State to go to trial on the back of a 911 call without the necessity of bringing the victim to trial. The lack of a victim has in the past been the primary means for getting these cases dismissed. This option is now severely curtailed by Soliz.

Continued Assault on the Rights Against Unlawful Search & Seizure

The 10th Circuit Court issued another remarkable ruling that continues the assault on the rights of individuals to be free of unlawful search and seizure. In U.S. v. Roach (10th Cir. 2009), the court ruled that although a warrant lacked probable cause, the evidence seized during the unlawful search is admissible so long as the officers acted in good faith.

An affidavit was issued in support of the warrant from the federal magistrate. The affidavit failed to establish probable cause that the defendant was a member of the gang under investigation. The affidavit also failed to establish that the defendant even lived at the residence that was to be searched. In fact, the residence was the defendant's girlfriend's residence.

The unlawful search unsupported by probable cause for the warrant resulted in the seizure of a variety of drugs and firearms. The defendant moved to suppress the illegally obtained evidence. The motion to suppress was denied.

In U.S. v. Roach, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the denial of the suppression motion. In doing so, the court acknowledged a warrant should issue only on probable cause. The Court further stated that there must be probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, the defendant committed the crime and that the place to be searched has some connection to the crime. The court stated that probable cause could not be built upon hunches.

Then despite the very clear state of the law the Court ruled that suppression of the evidence must be refused if the officers executing the warrant relied in good faith on the authorization of the magistrate.

This is pretty remarkable circuitous reasoning clearly directed toward further restrictions on the rights against unlawful search and seizure. After all, did the officers themselves not provide the magistrate with the affidavit upon which the warrant was issued? So the officers are relying upon the magistrate who issued the warrant who relied upon the affidavit provided by the officers. In short, the officers have relied upon their own faulty affidavit which failed to establish probable cause. How can this ever be construed as good faith?